This paper describes a semi-fragile watermarking scheme for image authentication and tamper-proofing. Each watermark bit is duplicated and randomly embedded in the original image in the discrete wavelet domain by modifying the corresponding image coefficients through quantization. The modifications are made so that they have little effect on the image and that the watermarking is robust against tampering. The watermark image for authentication is reconstructed by taking a weighted vote on the extracted bits. The bits that lose the vote are treated as having been tampered with, and the locations of the lost bits as indicating tampered positions. Thus, authentication and tamper-proofing can be done by observing the images of watermarks that win and lose votes. Sieving, emphasis, and weighted vote were found to be effectively make the authentication and tamper detection more accurate. The proposed scheme is robust against JPEG compression or acceptable modifications, but sensitive to malicious attacks such as cutting and pasting.
Introduction
The success of the Internet has brought about substantial benefits, one of which is multimedia distribution. However, it has also introduced new challenges to copyright protection and tamper-proofing because multimedia data are easy to copy or modify. Watermarking is one solution to this problem. Several digital watermarking algorithms have been proposed. Among these is a robust watermarking system that embeds a solid watermark and protects copyrights [1] , [2] . However it is difficult for robust watermarking to respond to a wide variety of possible distortions including malicious modifications.
To solve this problem, fragile watermarking that can detect what kinds of distortions have occurred to the image has been proposed. The watermark in this algorithm is weakly embedded so that it is sensitive to distortions. The receiver can check the integrity of the received image by extracting and verifying the watermark. A method based on this algorithm was proposed by Kunder and Hatzinakos [3] who used a tamperassessment function (TAF) to check the integrity of im- ages. Another fragile scheme [4] pairs DCT blocks and relates randomly chosen coefficients in one DCT block to coefficients in the other DCT block. The voting system in this scheme is used to reconstruct the watermark image which effectively prevents tampering. Although these methods can be used to detect various kinds of possible distortions, they may not be effective against non-malicious modifications such as JPEG compression because the watermark is too weak. (When we say "JPEG compression", it refers to the standard JPEG compression throughout this paper.) Semi-fragile watermarking algorithms have therefore been proposed to overcome this problem. Semifragile watermarks are tolerant to acceptable modifications but sensitive to malicious attacks such as cutting and pasting. Ko [5] and Chi [6] developed semi-fragile watermarking schemes. (The scheme [4] would be robust against some JPEG compression or other nonmalicious modifications by adjusting the difference of the DCT values of the adjacent blocks, but the robustness is not explicitly stated nor is evaluated.) However, these used the discrete cosine transform and were therefore not compatible with the JPEG 2000 standard [7] whose method of compression was based on the Discrete Wavelet Transform (DWT). Semi-fragile schemes that use DWT are those by Yu et al. [8] , Shin et al. [9] , Ke et al. [10] , and Zhou et al. [11] . Yu et al. and Shin et al. used the block mean difference to make their scheme tolerant to the acceptable modifications. Ke et al. used chaos to generate the watermark. Zhou et al. used error-correction coding (ECC), which was, however, reported to be vulnerable to attacks that modified the maximum or minimum values in 8x8 blocks.
An additional problem was posed by Holiman and Memon [12] i.e., collage attacks where the watermark is predicted from several watermarked images, and embedded it into unauthorized images to counterfeit authentication. A database that indicates the relation between image coefficients and watermark bits is needed for the attack to succeed. Holiman and Memon claim that when a watermark scheme uses a binary watermark and each image coefficient is related to a watermark bit, only a few images are needed for the attack to be successful and a high-quality unauthorized image can be produced. Conventional block-based schemes such as Kunder and Hatzinakos' and Zhou et al.'s are vulnerable to these attacks. Tang and Chen [13] gener-ated a watermark by correlating the adjacent pixels of all sub-bands in level 3 to protect against the collage attack. Shin et al. also dealt with these attacks.
There are some applications where watermarks need to be embedded into images instantly when they are created, e.g., by digital cameras to guarantee that they are genuine. The schemes in such real-time applications should have a low overhead for the embedding process. It is still an open issue as to how a low overhead with semi-fragility and robustness against counterfeiting attacks can be achieved. The blind watermark approach (instead of non-blind) with visual authentication is preferable in practical applications that require convenience over a wide range of uses.
We establish our study on semi-fragile watermarking by taking the blind approach to address these issues. We consider it has:
• To be robust against non-malicious modifications but sensitive to malicious modifications, • To be able to deal with the counterfeiting attacks, • To be accurate in visually authenticating and detecting tampering, and • To reduce the overhead.
We duplicate the watermark bits and correlate them with coefficients extracted from the original image before the watermark is embedded, which makes the scheme robust against both non-malicious attacks and counterfeit attacks. We use a pre-determined key to embed the watermark bits to reduce the overhead. The watermark in authentication is reconstructed from duplicated embedded watermark bits as an image using a weighted vote. The tamper-proofing is achieved with a tamper-detection image using a weighted vote, sieving, and emphasis.
A preliminarily version of this paper was presented at the International Conference on Intelligent Computing and Information Systems 2004 [14] . The current paper presents further improvements and detailed results obtained by evaluating our approach. The remaining sections of this paper are organized as follows. The wavelet transform of images is briefly explained in Section 2. Section 3 describes the algorithm we use in our scheme for embedding the watermark, authenticating it, and making tamper-detection evident. Section 4 presents the results obtained from evaluating our scheme and discussions. Section 5 draws some conclusions.
Wavelet Transform of Images
To transform an original image, f , to the frequency band, we use DWT to make it compatible with the JPEG 2000 standard. To perform the forward DWT, the JPEG 2000 standard uses the one-dimensional (1-D) sub-band decomposition of a 1-D set of samples into low-pass and high-pass samples. Low-pass samples represent a down-sampled low-resolution version of the original set. High-pass samples represent a downsampled residual version of the original set. When twodimensional DWT (2DDWT) is performed, the image is decomposed into hierarchical sub-bands. The basic idea of underlying 2DDWT is to decompose the frequency into four sub-bands, i.e., LL1, HL1, LH1, and HH1, by sub-sampling horizontal and vertical channels using sub-band filters [15] . The sub-bands labeled HL1, LH1, and HH1 represent wavelet coefficients on the finest scale. Sub-band LL1 is further decomposed and sub-sampled to obtain wavelet coefficients on the next coarsest scale. This process is repeated several times, as determined by the specific application.
Le Gall reversible 5-tap/3-tap and Daubechies irreversible 9-tap/7-tap filters are supported in the JPEG 2000 standard. We use the former to ensure there is less impact on the watermark.
Given a digital image, f , and a digital watermark, w, we modify the DWT coefficients of f by w. We denote the DWT coefficients by f l,k (m, n), where l denotes the level, k ∈ {lh, hl, hh} denotes the sub-band, and (m, n) denotes the position. The watermarked DWT coefficients are reconstructed by inverse DWT (IDWT).
Proposed Method
Our method duplicates the watermark image, w, and embeds the duplicated watermark into DWT coefficients, f l,k (m, n). It consists of two steps for the watermarking process and three steps for the authentication.
Prior to watermarking, the process is prepared with the embedding key ckey, which consists of the following elements.
A set of (l, k, m, n): Randomly generated quadlets in this set determine the levels, sub-bands, and positions to be watermarked. cnum: The number of duplications of w. ∆: The quantization parameter that determines the robustness of the watermark and is used in the quantization process. ∆ LL : Another quantization parameter that determines the sensitivity to collage attacks and is used to correlate the watermark bits with coefficients chosen from the LL sub-band of f l,k (m, n).
Watermarking Process
The watermarking process is outlined in Fig. 1 . To achieve robustness against counterfeiting attacks, we first correlate watermark bits with image coefficients. The DWT coefficients are then modified according to the correlated watermark bits. 
Correlating Watermark Bits with Image Coefficients
Holiman and Memon suggested that an image coefficient used for watermark embedding should be correlated with other positions in the watermarked image to protect against collage attacks. An attacker cannot simply use a collage attack due to the correlation because the embedded watermark bits are dependent on the image being watermarked. The correlation has to be done under the following conditions.
1. The image coefficients selected for correlation must not belong to the set of image coefficients to be watermarked and must be robust against nonmalicious modifications. 2. The correlation must be done with a low overhead.
Shin et al. and Tang and Chen satisfied the condition 1 by carefully scanning the image coefficients to find the coefficients, but they did not take the conditions 2 into account. The LL subband is used for correlation in our scheme because watermarking LL coefficients results in the original image being severely affected, and it is thereby free for correlation without introducing conflict. Moreover, the coefficients in the LL sub-band are robust against modifications including non-malicious ones. We choose correlating coefficients in the LL sub-band from predetermined embedding positions instead of determining them through scanning to satisfy the condition 2.
We XOR the corresponding watermarking bit with the average of four contiguous pixels in the level-3 LL sub-band to correlate the image coefficient to be watermarked with the selected image coefficients. The position of the pixels is determined by making use of the wavelet parent-child relationship [1] . The steps for determining the positions are described as follows: (See Fig. 2 .) 1) Let (x, y) be the position chosen from f l,k (m, n) to be watermarked. The coefficient in the LL sub-band related to (x, y) is determined as:
2) The four adjacent pixels at (x LL , y LL ), (x LL , y LL + 1), (x LL + 1, y LL ), and (x LL + 1, y LL + 1) are averaged and quantized by p ∆LL mod 2, where p is the averaged value. The quantized value is then XORed with the duplicated watermark bit, which is to be embedded into the original image.
Correlating the coefficients to be watermarked with the values obtained through these steps increases the probability that LL sub-band coefficients will overlap. This means when a coefficient is modified, the modification will also affect adjacent coefficients. If an attacker tries to counterfeit the scheme, he or she will need to modify a large amount of coefficients in the LL sub-band leading to a severely damaged image.
Quantization for Embedding Watermarks
The quantization function, Q(·), which maps an integer to a binary value, is used to embed an XORed duplicated watermark bit, b. This is defined as:
where ∆ is the quantization parameter, and f is the DWT-transformed image. Figure 3 illustrates the mapping. In Kunder and Hatzinakos' method [3] , ∆ is simply added to the wavelet coefficients during the embedding process. This process has a considerable effect on the image and makes it susceptible to distortion. We improve this by making the embedded value take the median of the interval. (See Fig. 4 
the value is the median of that interval: where
is equal to b and the value of f l,k (m, n) is the median of the interval:
Although the quantization process will make the watermark robust, modifying the coefficients so that they take values at middle of the interval might cause vulnerability to counterfeiting attacks. It would provide the attacker with helpful information to predict the watermark. A slight modification, e.g., randomly changing the value slightly within the quantization interval, would improve the security level. The watermark extraction process requires no additional information by this modification. 
Authentication
The authentication process is outlined in Fig. 5 . It consists of three steps: 1) extracting the duplicated watermark bits, 2) reconstructing the embedded watermark, and 3) detecting the possibly tampered image.
Extracting Duplicated Watermark
This step is the reverse of the embedding process. The embedded duplicated watermark bits correlated with LL coefficients are extracted referring to ckey. The extracted bits are XORed with the quantized LL coefficients also extracted from the received DWT image to obtain the duplicated watermark bits.
Reconstructing Watermark Image Using Weighted Vote
The duplicated watermark bits are collected to determine all the watermark-image bits. For the determination, we take a weighted vote on the collected watermark bits to determine these. Because coarser scales are more robust against modifications than finer scales in the DWT domain [2] , we place more weight on the duplicated watermark bits that are embedded in the coarser sub-band. Placing more weight on the coarser scale makes the duplicated watermark bits embedded in the coarser sub-bands have a greater effect on the vote to determine the watermark image bits, leading to more robust authentication. (A vote with unit weights is referred to as a "non-weighted vote".) Figure 6 shows a pseudo-code for reconstructing a watermark image, where w(x, y) denotes the watermark image bit at (x, y), and W e[ ] is an array of extracted duplicates of w(x, y). The element of the array takes a value of {1, −1} instead of {1, 0} so that a value of zero has a negative effect on the weighted vote to determine the watermark image. L1weight, L2weight, and L3weight correspond the weights for levels 1, 2, and 3. The optimum values for these weights are determined through experiments. 
Constructing Tamper-detection Image
We assume that positions where bits lost their votes are tampered positions. Bits losing their votes are plotted in the same positions as the watermarks on a blank image in the 3-level DWT domain.
We sieve trivial distorion to distinguish tampering while emphasizing the tampering as follows. The tamper detection image at level 3 is divided into 2x2 sized blocks. Blocks with the same positions in HH, HL, and LH sub-bands are collected. Each block at level 3 has a parent-child relationship with 4x4 blocks at level 2, and 8x8 blocks at level 1 as seen in Fig. 7 . We count the number of watermark bits in the collected blocks at level 3 together with related blocks at levels 2 and 1. The counting is carried out the same way as the weighted vote, i.e., the level-3 watermark bits are weighted more than the level-2 watermark bits. The ratio of the number of tampered watermark bits to that of embedded watermark bits is then calculated. If the ratio is greater than the threshold, T emphasis , they are emphasized by setting all bits in the blocks. If the ratio is less than the threshold, T seive (≤ T emphasis ), they are sieved by clearing all bits in the blocks.
The left side of Fig. 7 has a tamper-detection image, where the gray squares represent undamaged, and black squares represent damaged bits. The right side of the figure shows the method we use for the weighted counting of the undamaged and damaged bits and the damage-ratio results. The weights at levels 1, 2, and 3 correspond to 1, 6, and 8.
Evaluation and Discussion
We implemented our scheme with Java TM 2 SDK, Standard Edition Version 1.4.2 to evaluate it. We used a 512 × 512 sized gray-scale image as the original image and a 32 × 32 sized binary image as the watermark image. The number of duplicated watermark bits is cnum × 32 × 32 = 1024cnum. We used the printed name of one of the authors for the watermark image.
Degradation of Image Caused by Watermarking
The proposed method of quantization is expected to lessen the degree of image degradation caused by watermarking. We measured the degradation in terms of the P SN R of watermarked images, which is defined as 20 log 10
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RM SE , where RM SE is the root-mean-square error between the original and watermarked images. Figure 8 plots the dependence of P SN R on cnum and ∆. The image to be watermarked was that of a "Bridge."
We compared the P SN R of the image watermarked with our method with Kunder and Hatzinakos' [3] to evaluate our technique of quantization. The results are plotted in Fig. 9 . The P SN R is about 3 dB better than that with the conventional method when ours is applied.
Robustness
The major concerns with watermarks are their robustness against non-malicious and counterfeiting attacks. The latter is achieved by correlating coefficients. This subsection describes and discusses our evaluations of the robustness of our scheme against non-malicious modifications and counterfeiting attacks. We mainly evaluate the effects of quantization in this subsection with respect to robustness against non-malicious attacks. "Voting" refers to non-weighted voting in this subsection. We will deal with the effects of weighted votes in later Subsection 4.3.
Evaluation of Robustness
We modified the watermarked images by typical nonmalicious attacks, softening and 30% JPEG compression. We then evaluated the dependence of the corruption probability of duplicated watermark bits and the watermark image on ∆ and cnum. "Bridge", "Lena", and "Boat" were used for the original images. They were softened so that their respective P SN Rs were 31.78, 39.12, and 35.10. The results are listed in Tables 1-4. Tables 1 and  2 give the ratios of extracted watermark bits damaged by softening and JPEG compression to duplicated wa-termark bits. Tables 3 and 4 give the damage ratios for reconstructed watermark images. Here, the reconstructed watermark images were obtained by taking a vote on duplicated watermark bits, which were distorted by softening and JPEG compression to the original watermark images. We can see from Tables 1 and  2 that when ∆ is increased, the duplicated watermark bits become more robust. From Tables 3 and 4 , we can see that the more cnum or ∆ is increased, the more robust the watermark image is. This is because when the number of non-damaged bits is increased, voting results in more accurate decisions. However, when ∆ = 5 (embedding is too weak), the watermark image was severely damaged even if cnum was increased. From  Fig. 8 and Tables 1-4 we can see that there is a tradeoff between ∆, cnum, and the P SN R, i.e., the more ∆ or cnum is increased, the more robust to distortion the watermark is, but the more severely the original image is damaged.
Comparative Evaluation
We compared our scheme with the one of the previously study done by Kunder and Hatzinakos [3] on the detection of tampering in images. The comparison was made with respect to robustness against various non-malicious modifications by examining the ratio of damaged bits to the total number of duplicated watermark bits under non-malicious benchmarks i.e., 30% JPEG compression, 50% JPEG compression, 1% Salt-and-Pepper noise, and a median filter, denoted by "30%", "50%", "Noise", and "Med".
The watermarking strength was standardized and the parameters were set to achieve two levels of imageto-watermark ratio, namely, P SN R = 38 and 41 dB as was done in Ref. [16] , i.e., ∆ = 15 and 10 for Kunder's method [3] , and ∆ = 20 and 15 for ours. The number of embedded watermark bits was set to 15360 for both. The images modified under the standardized watermarking were not so much degraded that artifacts were perceived even if P SN R=38 dB. There were some visible artifacts on the images when P SN R = 35 dB. (∆ = 30 and cnum = 15 for our scheme.) Table 5 lists the results averaged for 10 watermarked images. The method we propose was found to be more robust against acceptable modifications than the previous scheme from the results. This is because a watermark is embedded by modifying coefficients so that they are the median of the intervals with our method, while with Kunder and Hatzinakos' method [3] , a watermark is simply embedded by adding ∆.
The optimal embedding strength of the proposed method depends on applications. In case of 30% JPEG compression, ∆=20 and cnum=15 (P SN R=38 dB) can be applied for the watermark to be robust against the non-malicious modifications and to detect malicious ones. 
Robustness Evaluation against Collage Attack
The watermark bits should be correlated with image coefficients to protect against collage attacks as described in Section 3.1.1. We ensure the robustness against the attacks by correlating the watermark bits with overlapped coefficients in the LL sub-band. However, these LL coefficients are randomly chosen because the corresponding quadlets (l, k, m, and n) are randomly generated. This means that there may be non-overlapping coefficients. An attacker would succeed in a collage attack in these non-overlapping areas, and if they were large, he or she would have a greater possibility of success. Therefore, we examined the ratio of nonoverlapping coefficients to the total number of coefficients in the LL sub-band to evaluate the possibility of an attack succeeding.
The results in Table 6 indicate that there are few non-overlapping coefficients when a sufficient number of duplicated watermark bits are embedded (about 0.1% when there are 15360 duplicated watermark bits). Even when there are 5120 duplicated watermark bits, which are too few for watermarking, the ratio is 5.2%.
Note that an attacker can not succeed in an attack even if he or she knows of the embedded watermark bits and their positions without knowing ∆ LL to correlate them with the LL coefficients. If the quantization parameters ∆ and ∆ LL were exposed in addition to the watermark positions, which is an extreme case unlikely to happen, the scheme would become vulnerable to collage attacks.
Also note that our scheme can detect an offset shifting because the watermark bits are correlated with the LL coefficients which are modified by the shifting, although the offset can not be adjusted correctly.
Weighted Vote, Sieving, and Emphasis
Because coarser-scaled wavelet coefficients are more ro-bust against modifications [2] , we placed larger weights on coefficients in level 3 than those in finer-scaled levels modified by the duplicated watermark bits. In the following, we first experimentally determine the optimum weights to be placed on the coefficients in each level. The effectiveness of the voting with the optimally determined weights is then evaluated.
Optimum Weights
The optimum weights for voting were determined as follows. We employed 60% JPEG compression and a median filter for typical non-malicious modifications and evaluated the effect of weighted votes by placing various weights on coefficients in levels 1, 2, and 3, with the weight on level 1 fixed to L1weight = 1.
The results are plotted in Figs. 10 and 11 , where the X-and Y-axes indicate the weights of votes in levels 2 and 3, and the Z-axis is the ratio of erroneously determined watermark image bits to the total number of watermark image bits. As we can see from the figures, placing larger weights on levels 2 and 3 in voting leads to reconstructed watermark images with fewer corrupted bits. However, placing weights that are too large on levels 2 and 3 may increase the error rate. This phenomenon reflects the different degree of robustness between levels. Thus, there are optimum conditions of L2weight = 6 and L3weight = 8 to 10 for JPEG compression. These optimum conditions remain unchanged by increasing L2weight and L3weight up to 100. Under JPEG compression rates of less than 60%, the optimum conditions were found to remain almost unchanged, i.e., 4 ≤ L2weight ≤ 6 and 8 ≤ L3weight ≤ 10.
We can see from Fig. 11 that the damaged ratios are slightly different from the case of JPEG compression when the median filter is applied, i.e., the damaged ratios decrease when L2weight and L3weight are increased up to 5 and 9, above which they become unchanged.
Therefore, the optimum weights 5 ≤ L2weight ≤ 6 and 9 ≤ L3weight ≤ 10 can be applied for voting.
Effectiveness of Weighted Vote, Sieving, and Emphasis
Here, we will examine the effectiveness of the weighted vote on the reconstructed watermark image. We will also examine the effectiveness of sieving, and emphasis with weighted counting on a tamper-detection image. The original image in Fig. 12 (a) was watermarked, then underwent 60% JPEG compression, and was tampered with by cutting-and-pasting as shown in Fig. 12 (b) . Figure 13 shows watermarks reconstructed by applying weighted votes on extracted duplicated watermark image bits. The results reveal that highly visible watermarks can be obtained by placing optimum weights in voting. 
Fig. 10
Error ratio of watermark-image bits vs. weights of vote on levels 2 and 3 when 60% JPEG compression is applied. Ratio(%) Fig. 11 Error ratio of watermark-image bits vs. weights of vote on levels 2 and 3 when a median filter is applied. Figure 14 shows a tamper-detection image obtained with and without sieving and emphasis on a tampered DWT image. The number of duplicated watermark bits was counted as described in Section 3.2.3 with an L2weight of 6 and an L3weight of 10. When sieving and emphasis were applied to a tamper-detection image, we varied T sieve and T emphasis so that T seive ≤ T emphasis . When T sieve is increased, non-malicious modifications tend to be gradually extinguished, while malicious modifications, cutting-and-pasting in this case, remain unsieved, which is more easily distinguished by increasing T emphasis . For the example illustrated in Fig. 14, the tampering was the most clearly visible when the thresholds were set to T sieve = T emphasis =0.35. Their optimum values depend on the types of modifications and are adaptively determined.
The block size for sieving and emphasis was set to 2x2. A smaller block size would have made the tamper detection more sensitive but it would have led to an uneven distribution of watermark bits embedded in each block. Blocks with a small number of watermark bits will make tamper detection inaccurate. When the block size is increased, the number of watermark bits in each block tends to be even, but it becomes more difficult to detect fine distortions.
Effectiveness of Tamper Detection
The watermark bits in our scheme were correlated with pixels in the level-3 LL sub-band by XORing to protect against counterfeiting attacks . One concern is that the correlation might dicrease the effectiveness of tamper detection. Here, we discuss how we examined what effect the correlation had on tamper detection through experiments and present the results.
A watermarked image was tampered with adding random values to pixels in a portion of it. We extracted the watermark bits from DWT space corresponding to the tampered portion. The ratio of damaged watermark bits to watermark bits embedded in the tampered portion was calculated. The tampering was repeated several times, and we calculated the average and standard deviation (SD) of the ratio. The average of damage ratios in this experiment is expected to be close to 50% because watermark bits take random values when the image is severely distorted [3] . The measure of degradation in tamper detection in this case is the variance in the averaged damage ratios. This measure is reasonable because if the variance is large, the probability of not detecting the tampering will increase. Table 7 lists the results compared with those obtained by Kunder and Hatzinakos [3] . Parameter ∆ in both schemes was set to 10, and there were 20480 embedded watermark bits. The size of the tampered portion was varied from 10 by 10 to 40 by 40 pixels. The results indicate that the average ratios of damaged watermark bits in the tampered area are almost 50%. The standard deviation in our scheme was slightly larger than that by Kunder and Hatzinakos [3] . This justifies the correlation to protect against counterfeiting attacks as tamper detection was not so degraded too much.
Embedding Speed
Our scheme enhances security with respect to tamper detection, robustness against non-malicious distortion, and countermeasures against collage attacks. There is a trade-off between the degree of security and overhead. Here, we will compare our scheme with other methods previously reported in regard to the embedding speed and security provided. We chose Kunder and Hatzinakos' method as being representative of simple ways of detecting tampering. We took Zhou et al.'s method as being representative of ways providing robustness against JPEG compression as well as tamper detection, and Tang and Chen's as being representative of methods of providing countermeasures against collage attacks in addition to tamper detection and robustness against non-malicious distortion.
We measured the time required for embedding a watermark by varying the number of watermark bits. The schemes were implemented with Java TM 2 SDK, Standard Edition Version 1.4.2. The experimental environment was a Windows 2000 operating system with a K6-2 processor operated at a clock rate of 533 MHz with 128 MB of main memory.
The results are plotted in Fig. 15 . The image sizes for schemes of Zhou et al.'s and Tang and Chen's schemes were varied according to the number of watermark bits due to the nature of their watermarking methods. The image sizes for other schemes were adjusted to that in Zhou et al. The results indicate that the time for embedding watermarks with our method is the shortest of these representatives except for Kunder and Hatzinakos' method which does not deal with robustness against non-malicious distortion or collage attacks.
Conclusions and Future Work
We proposed a semi-fragile watermark scheme that accurately detects distortion and provides a visual method of authentication with low overhead. The experimental results revealed that (1) our scheme was robust against acceptable modifications but sensitive to malicious attacks and that (2) a weighted vote on extracted watermark bits could effectively extract the correct watermark. They also revealed that (3) sieving and emphasis as well as a weighted vote could effectively reconstruct a highly visible tamper-detection image and that (4) our scheme had a low overhead in watermarking, which suggested that it is suited to realtime applications such as digital cameras.
The optimum values of the thresholds for sieving and emphasis were determined adaptively. Investigations on their statistical nature belongs to future work. 
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